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Abstract
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The authors analyze the Washington Consensus, which 
at its original formulation reflected views not only from 
Washington, but also from Latin America. Tracing the 
life of the Consensus from a Latin American perspective 
in terms of evolving economic development paradigms, 
they document the extensive implementation of 
Consensus-style reforms in the region as well as the 
mismatch between reformers’ expectations and actual 
outcomes, in terms of growth, poverty reduction, and 
inequality. They present an assessment of what went 
This paper—a product of the a joint product of the Office of the Chief Economist for Latin America and the Caribbean 
Region, and the Center for Global Development—is part of a larger effort in the two institutions to understand the 
evolution of development policy thinking in Latin America. Policy Research Working Papers are also posted on the Web 
at http://econ.worldbank.org. The authors may be contacted at adelatorre@worldbank.org, nbirdsall@cgdev.org, and 
fvalencia@worldbank.org.
wrong with the Washington Consensus-style reform 
agenda, using a taxonomy of views that put the blame, 
alternatively, on (i) shortfalls in the implementation 
of reforms combined with impatience regarding their 
expected effects; (ii) fundamental flaws—in either the 
design, sequencing, or basic premises of the reform 
agenda; and (iii) incompleteness of the agenda that left 
out crucial reform needs, such as volatility, technological 
innovation, institutional change and inequality. 
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1.    Introduction 
   
It is hard to overemphasize the practical and ideological importance of the Washington 
Consensus in Latin America.  The Decalogue of Consensus policies laid out by John Williamson 
in his 1989 landmark paper became in the minds of advocates and pundits alike a manifesto for 
capitalist economic development.  In the words of Moisés Naím (2000) the term “soon acquired 
a life of its own, becoming a brand name known worldwide and used independently of its 
original intent and even of its content.”  For its advocates, the Consensus reflected a doctrine of 
economic freedom that was best suited for the political democracies to which many Latin 
countries had returned after a long spell of military dictatorships (Williamson, 1993).  For its 
opponents, as Williamson (2002) himself noted later on, the Consensus was an unjust “set of 
neoliberal policies (…) imposed on hapless countries by the Washington-based international 
financial institutions.”  Regardless of the political stance, there is no denying that overall the 
Consensus became, in Moisés Naím’s (2002) epigrammatic expression, a “damaged brand.”   
 
The social and economic philosophy implicit in the Consensus was not created by 
Williamson.  It was, so to speak, “in the air”—a robust intellectual and ideological current of the 
times which emphasized the virtuous combination of political democracy and free markets.   
Williamson’s article rode on a global wave that transformed the conventional wisdom in favor of 
free market economics, which included the rise of neoclassical economics and the rational 
expectations revolution among academic macroeconomists.  It is not a coincidence then that the 
appearance in 1989 of the Washington Consensus coincided with fall of the Berlin Wall, which 
symbolically marked the burial of centrally planned economies. 
 
This article analyzes the birth, evolution, implications, and controversy surrounding 
Williamson’s Decalogue from a Latin American standpoint.  It is structured as follows.  Section 
2 provides the intellectual and economic context that preceded and gave rise to Washington 
Consensus.  Section 3 examines the Consensus itself, as formulated in Williamson’s article, and 
distinguishes between its academic origins and subsequent incursion into the ideological sphere.  
Section 4 describes the extent of implementation of Consensus-style reforms during the 1990s 
and Section 5 analyzes their economic outcomes.  Section 6 presents a typology views on what 
went wrong with the Washington Consensus and Section 7 concludes.  
 
2.  Economic and Intellectual Antecedents to the Consensus 
 
Around the time when Williamson’s article was first published, the intellectual 
effervescence had been sufficient to move the dominant economic development policy paradigm 
away from state dirigisme—which had prevailed in Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC) 
during the 1960s and 70s— towards a greater reliance on markets.  This mutation started in the 
1970s, gained momentum during the 1980s—when a corrosive and generalized debt crisis sunk 
the region into a “lost-decade” of economic slump—and reached its heights during the 1990s—
arguably the glorious years for the Washington Consensus.    
 
The mutation of the economic development paradigm that led to the Washington 
Consensus was neither easy nor smooth, or completely linear.  But the general outlines of this 3 
 
transition are clear enough and worth sketching.  Prior to this change, the policy views in the 
region had drawn heavily from the early development literature’s emphasis on capital 
accumulation and the view that widespread market failures in developing countries would hinder 
accumulation.  Markets were simply not expected to work properly in developing countries 
(Rosenstein-Rodin 1943, Gerschenkron, 1962; Hirschman, 1958; and Rostow, 1959).
1   It was 
less important to gain an adequate understanding of why private markets failed than to verify that 
they did fail, and badly.  Economic development—the argument went—was too important to be 
left at the mercy of flawed market forces and the state had to play a major role in accelerating 
capital accumulation.  The state was to control, directly or indirectly, the “Commanding Heights” 
of the economy and mobilize and allocate resources purposefully (often via multiyear planning).   
 
Interestingly and in contrast with the experience in East Asia, the pre-Washington 
Consensus LAC model of state dirigisme promoted inward-oriented economic development.   
There was of course no necessity in the internal logic of government activism for it to be 
associated with inward orientation, but in LAC it was and in a major way.  This link was 
promoted by important intellectual strands prevalent in the region.  It was consistent with the 
structuralist vision heralded by the Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean 
(ECLAC) and underpinned by the writings of Raul Prebisch (1950) and Hans Singer (1950).  For 
this vision, a virtuous circle between manufacturing growth and the expansion of domestic 
demand would enable LAC countries to break free from the terms-of-trade-deterioration trap.
2  
Prebisch (1950) thus famously declared that “industrialization has become the most important 
means of expansion.”  Inward orientation was also consistent with Hirschman’s notion—popular 
then in LAC—that the formation of strong backward linkages was crucial for sustained growth 
and hinged mainly on domestic economy dynamics.  It was also in line with the Marxist inspired 
Dependency Theory (Gunder Frank, 1967; Furtado, 1963; and Cardoso and Faletto, 1979), which 
interpreted the relation of the “periphery” (developing countries) to the “center” (rich countries) 
as one of debilitating dependency—i.e., a structural subordination of the periphery’s economic 
activity to the interests of the center that stifled the former’s technological dynamism and 
economic diversification.  
 
Dependency theory thus joined ECLAC-style structuralism and Hirschmanian views in 
emphasizing that the cure for underdevelopment was a proactive state pursuing industrial 
policies to secure the expansion of production for the domestic market.  This underpinned the 
import substituting industrialization (ISI) model that dominated the region in the 1960s and 
1970s.  Promoting domestic manufacturing to replace imports implied an intense, hands-on 
involvement of the state through a large set of interconnected interventions, including, state 
                                                 
1 These classic arguments have been formalized theoretically in terms of principal-agent problems, scale effects, and 
externalities (Hoff and Stiglitz, 2001; and Murphy, Shleifer, and Vishny, 1989). 
2 For Prebisch and Singer, the decline of the terms of trade for primary commodities was secular.  It emanated from 
the combination of a low income and price of global demand for commodities, on the one hand, and the excessive 
dependence of the periphery on primary goods exports, on the other.  It thus led to systematic resource transfers 
from the commodity-intensive periphery to the capital-intensive center.  4 
 
owned firms and banks, subsidization of infant industries, central planning, widespread price 
controls, high import tariffs and quotas, administered interest rates and directed credit.
3  
 
Figure 1.  Latin America and East Asia: Relative GDP per capita (1900-2008) 




Note: GDP PPP figures, LAC is the weighted average of Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, 
Mexico, Peru, Uruguay and Venezuela. Last two years using WDI growth rates.  
Source: Historical Statistics of the World Economy, Maddison (2006) and World Development 
Indicators (2010). 
 
LAC did grow robustly during the height of the ISI period but so did the world; hence, its 
per capita income did not on average converge significantly towards that of the rich countries—a 
fact that often goes unnoticed (Figure 1). In any case, ISI showed signs of exhaustion around the 
late 1970s, as the initial growth dynamism of inward-looking industrialization subsided and 
associated macroeconomic imbalances mounted.  While this was a heterogeneous process and 
with different timings across countries in the region,
4 it was the Debt Crisis of the 1980s that 
intensified and synchronized LAC countries’ movement away from ISI to embrace the rising 
                                                 
3 ISI was politically attractive and ideologically appealing for key interest groups that were increasingly entrenched.  
Overvalued exchange rates ensured cheap imports of capital goods for the rising industrial class, along with 
protection of their consumer products in the domestic market.  Cheap borrowing on external markets and easy fiscal 
and monetary policies allowed for expanding job creation in urban areas, including in the public sector and state 
enterprises.  By protecting activities oriented towards the domestic market and using an overvalued exchange rate to 
keep urban prices low, ISI policies acted as a tax on exporting agriculture.  This dislodged the traditional power of 
large hacienda owners and contributed to increasing rural-urban migration, while creating a powerful new set of 
political constituencies in the rapidly growing urban areas (Lipton, 1977).  
4 For example, Argentina and Brazil borrowed heavily to finance import-substitution while Mexico mainly to 




















































































































global wave of pro-market policies.
5  While triggered by an external shock—the sharp rise in 
dollar interest rates engineered by the U.S. Fed to fight inflation—the severity of the debt crisis 
reflected the magnification of that shock by the dangerous accumulation of domestic 
vulnerabilities, until then hidden under the mirage created of an unusually benign external 
environment (Kuczynski and Williamson, 2003).  Global interest rates as well as high 
commodity prices had invited or at least allowed what in retrospect were unsustainable policies.   
 
As the debt crisis deepened, the dark side of inward-looking industrialization and 
associated macro imbalances was manifested in a well-known catalog of maladies.  These 
included internationally uncompetitive industries; severely distorted relative prices leading to 
inefficient allocation of resources; rent-seeking and corruption in the administered allocation or 
rationing of credit, fiscal, and foreign exchange resources; bottlenecks and economic 
overheating; large public deficits; excessive foreign borrowing by Latin sovereigns; rising and 
unstable inflation (and actual hyperinflation in several countries).
6  
 
The economic and social pain involved in the adjustment process of the 1980s was 
immense, so much so that the period became known as the Lost Decade.  As capital inflows 
abruptly stopped and terms of trade deteriorated sharply, the region was forced to shift from an 
aggregate external current account deficit of almost U$2 billion in 1981 to a surplus of more than 
U$39 billion in 1984.
7  This was induced by major currency devaluations and severe restrictions 
on imports, including of vital capital and intermediate goods, which implied a dramatic erosion 
of real wages and living standards.  To put the fiscal accounts in order, countries embarked on 
deep and highly disruptive expenditure cuts, which hit disproportionately social and 
infrastructure investment programs.  Living standards collapsed—the regional average per capita 
income in 1985 barely exceeded that of 1975 and for some countries it fell to levels prevailing in 
the mid-1960s (Balassa et al., 1986).  Unemployment rose to more than 15 percent in many 
countries while underemployment swelled.  Inflation averaged 150 percent in the region, 
exploding into hyperinflation in Bolivia, Argentina and Brazil.  Concerted debt rescheduling and 
roll-overs coupled with “new money” were engineered during the 1980s but they proved 
woefully insufficient as the problem was one of debt overhang.
8  It was solved belatedly, as the 
internationally community reluctantly accepted the need for debt reduction and restructuring, 
implemented during 1989-1995 by a number of LAC countries (including Mexico, Costa Rica, 
Venezuela, Argentina, Brazil, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Peru) under the Brady Initiative.  
 
                                                 
5 The beginning of the Debt Crisis was marked by a fateful 1982 meeting in Washington D.C. when Mexican 
officials announced their payment difficulties to the US Secretary of Treasury.  Mexican and Brazilian bond spreads 
skyrocketed 600 to 800 basis points.  As the IMF offered Mexico U$5 billion in emergency lending, Mexico 
nationalized the banks and announced that principal payments on the foreign debt would be suspended until 1984.   
6 For analyses of ISI in Latin America see Hirschman (1968), Baer (1972), Balassa (1980) and Fishlow (1987).  A 
more positive assessment is Thorp (1998) History of Latin America in the 20
th Century and its companion volumes. 
7 In terms of net external transfer of resources, Latin America and the Caribbean swung from inward net transfers of 
U$11.3 billion in 1981 to net outward transfers U$18.7 billion in 1982 and to an average outward transfer of 
US$26.4 billion from 1982 to 1986.  
8 The debt overhang is defined by debt levels that are high enough as to act as a 100 percent marginal tax on 
investment effort, thus undercutting growth.  See Myers (1977), Krugman (1988) and Corden (1991).  6 
 
Given the severity of the crisis, it is not surprising that by the end of the 1980s and the 
beginning of the 1990s the region was prepared for a major change.  Economically, Sebastian 
Edwards (1995) summed up this paradigmatic change: “During the 1980s and early 1990s, there 
was a marked transformation in economic thinking in Latin America.  The once-dominant view 
based on heavy state interventionism, inward orientation, and disregard for macroeconomic 
balance slowly gave way to a new paradigm based on competition, market orientation and 
openness.”  Politically, the economic hardships tested the recently restored democracies (which 
followed the military dictatorships of the 1960s and 1970s in Argentina, Brazil, Bolivia, 
Ecuador, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay and Uruguay).  Against this 
background, by 1989 the shift away from “state-led industrialism” (as Ocampo and Ros, 
forthcoming 2010, aptly name it) or “import-substitution industrialization” (as it is more 
commonly known) towards a market-led model gained critical momentum.  
 
3.  The Washington Consensus 
 
Williamson’s article was thus published when the region was already on the road of 
change.  What Williamson did was to summarize in a Decalogue of 10 policies (Table 1) the 
converging views that had clearly emerged among the participants (including many prominent 
Latin American scholars and policy makers) in an 1989 Institute of International Economics 
Conference organized in Washington, D.C. by John Williamson himself entitled Latin American 
Adjustment: How Much Has Happened?  While reflecting his own views, Williamson’s (1990) 
article constitutes a synthesis of policies already in vogue at the time—in Washington and the 
region as well.  Indeed, Williamson is better portrayed as a recorder than a creator of the new 
paradigm, and the real actors in the drama of the decade that ensued were the technocrats and 
political leaders in the region itself.
9 
 
These winds of change were reflected not just in Williamson’s piece but in other 
visible—though less influential—writings of the time, who urged export-orientation, increased 
savings along with efficient investment, as well as a simplification and streamlining of a hitherto 
all too present role of government.  Williamson would later make repeated reference to Toward 
Renewed Economic Growth in Latin America (Balassa et al., 1986) in his own formulation.  
Even ECLAC—still viewed as the intellectual home of a more state-led approach to 
development—supplemented the shift away from inward orientation.  For example, Bianchi, 
Devlin and Ramos (1987) argued that “the debt problem requires a structural transformation of 
the economy in at least two senses: the growth strategy needs to be outward oriented and largely 
based on an effort to raise savings and productivity.”  Similarly, Fajnzylber (1990), after 
examining the contrast with East Asia, saw the need for a major change in Latin America’s 
economic policy direction in order to combine market-oriented reforms with policies targeted 
towards the poor. 
 
                                                 
9 The role of the international financial institutions, which pushed for the reforms, often conditioning their loans on 
reform progress, remains a matter of debate.  Reforms would not have been implemented only in response to outside 
pressure—but the pressure was probably not irrelevant to their timing and depth, and in some cases to the backlash 
that they created. 7 
 
The Washington Consensus was a Latin version of what had in fact become a worldwide 
consensus by the 1990s.  It had in common with the international version the conviction that 
economic prosperity could only be obtained by harnessing the power of markets.  This was 
associated with a view of government interventionism as a fountainhead of distortions that 
represses creativity and causes resources to be misallocated.  The new paradigm called for 
allowing the free play of market forces to coordinate through price signals myriads of 
decentralized decisions of firms and individuals, thus enabling efficient resource allocation and 
fostering creative entrepreneurship.  In sharp contrast with the old paradigm, the new one 
proclaimed that economic development was too important to be left in the hands of government 
planners and bureaucrats.  Development policy, therefore, had to focus on freeing and enabling 
markets to “get prices right.”  Official World Bank and Inter-American Development Bank 
(IDB) documents that appeared during the 1980s heralded the coming of this new age for 
development thinking, clearly signaling that the view had left academic circles and was being 
mainstreamed into practical policy.
10 
 
But there were two other defining features in the Latin version of the new paradigm that 
were duly captured in the Washington Consensus.  The first was the quest for macroeconomic 
stabilization. The second entailed a marked shift towards an outward oriented growth strategy.  
Given that chronic macroeconomic maladies had become a Latin trademark, it is not at all 
surprising that the need to introduce macroeconomic policy rectitude would be high in LAC’s 
development agenda.  The shift towards sound macro management was understood as a pre-
condition for market-based development.  The shift towards an outwardly orientated growth 
strategy was propelled by the exhaustion of import substitution and the success of East Asian 
export-led growth, which had put these economies on a frank path towards per capita income 
convergence with the industrialized countries.
11  
 
A careful review of Table 1 shows clearly that Williamson’s actual formulation of the 
Consensus emphasized the technical dimensions of economic policy and is measured and 
balanced in its overall prescriptions.  Its Latin American flavor comes through policy 
prescriptions geared to addressing Latin-specific maladies: macroeconomic stabilization (e.g., 
fiscal discipline to avoid high inflation, tax reform to broaden the tax base and positive real 
interest rates to overcome financial repression) and outward orientation (e.g., the elimination of 
import quotas and low and uniform import tariffs and a competitive exchange rate to induce non-
traditional export growth and the removal of barriers to FDI).  The pro-market agenda was 
embodied in policies aimed at: removing the entrepreneurial function of the state (e.g., 
privatization of state enterprises); freeing and enabling markets (via deregulation, the 
strengthening of property rights, moderate marginal tax rates, low and uniform import tariffs and 
                                                 
10 See, for instance, the World Bank’s World Development Reports International Capital and Economic 
Development (1985); Trade and Pricing Policies in World Agriculture (1986); and Industrialization and Foreign 
Trade (1987) as well as the Inter-American Development Bank’s Economic and Social Progress Reports Economic 
Integration (1984); External Debt: Crisis and Adjustment (1985); and Agricultural Development (1986). 
11 During the 1970s and 1980s, the East Asian Tigers took off while LAC stagnated and lost ground.  The ratio of 
per capita income (nominal dollars) of the East Asian Tigers to that of the United States rose from less than 20 
percent in the late 1960s to around 40 percent by the late 1980s.   By contrast, the same ratio for LAC hovered 
around 30 percent during the 1970s and fell to less than 25 percent by the late 1980s (see again, Figure 1). 8 
 
a level playing field for foreign and domestic firms); and complementing markets (via the 
reorientation of public expenditures to primary education, health and infrastructure, both for 
growth and to improve the distribution of income). 
 
Table 1.  The Decalogue of Washington Consensus Policies (1989) 
 
1.  Fiscal  Discipline  Budget deficits—properly measured to include local governments, state 
enterprises, and the central bank—should be small enough to be financed 
without recourse to the inflation tax. 
2.  Public Expenditure 
Re-Prioritization 
Public spending should move away from politically popular but economically 
unwarranted projects (bloated bureaucracies, indiscriminate subsidies, white 
elephants) and towards neglected fields with high economic returns and the 
potential to improve income distribution (primary health and education, 
infrastructure). 
3.  Tax Reform  To improve incentives and horizontal equity, the tax base should be broad and 
marginal tax rates moderate.  Taxing interest on assets held abroad (“flight 
capital”) should become a priority in the medium term. 
4.  Positive Real Interest 
Rates 
Ultimately, interest rates should be market determined.  As this could be 
destabilizing in an environment of weak confidence, policy should have more 
modest objectives for the transition, mainly to abolish preferential interest rates 
for privileged borrowers and achieve a moderately positive real interest rate. 
5.  Competitive Exchange 
Rates 
Countries need a unified (at least for trade transactions) exchange rate set at a 
level sufficiently competitive to induce a rapid growth in non-traditional 
exports, and managed so as to assure exporters that this competitiveness will be 
maintained in the future. 
6.  Trade Liberalization  Quantitative trade restrictions should be replaced by tariffs, and these should be 
progressively reduced until a uniform low tariff in the range of 10 percent is 
achieved. 
7.  Foreign Direct 
Investment 
Barriers impeding foreign direct investment and the entry of foreign firms 
should be abolished; foreign and domestic firms should be allowed to compete 
on equal terms. 
8.  Privatization  State enterprises should be privatized. 
9.  Deregulation  Governments should abolish regulations that impede the entry of new firms or 
restrict competition, and ensure that all regulations are justified by such criteria 
as safety, environmental protection, or prudential supervision of financial 
institutions. 
10.  Property Rights  The legal system should provide secure property rights without excessive costs, 
and make these available to the informal sector. 
 
Sources: Williamson (1990) and Williamson (1993). 
 
In contrast to the popular perception, Williamson’s Decalogue is a far cry from market 
fundamentalism.  He does not even mention the liberalization of the (non-FDI) capital account—
which became increasingly controversial in the policy debate as the 1990s unfolded.  On the 
liberalization of domestic financial markets, Williamson is restrained calling only for gradually 9 
 
allowing interest rates to be market determined.  Similarly, he steers away from the polar choices 
in exchange rate policy—a hard peg or a fully free floating rate—which are arguably most 
consistent with the unfettered play of market forces.
12 Instead, he advocates keeping a 
“competitive exchange rate” which in practice requires discretional intervention by the central 
bank.  Paradoxically, as will be seen later, actual policy implementation in Latin America was 
much more aggressive precisely with respect to financial liberalization and exchange rate policy, 
the two areas where Williamson had been distinctively cautious.   
 
Williamson’s formulation is also a far cry from a radical view in favor of a minimalist 
state that is commonly attributed to the Consensus.  There is no supply-side economics calling 
for a reduction in tax burdens or a major shrinking of the size of the state.  To be sure, the 
privatization of state enterprises is a central policy in Williamson’s Decalogue, but it is not 
justified as a means to reduce the size of the state but to achieve economic efficiency and 
reorient government spending in favor of health, education and infrastructure, much of this in 
order for the state to play a greater redistributive role.  In this respect, Williamson subsumed 
some of the equity considerations that had appeared, for instance, in UNICEF’s (1987) report on 
Adjustment with a Human Face.   
    
Later on, Williamson (2000) characterized his ten policy items as summarizing the 
“lowest common denominator of policy advice being addressed by the Washington-based 
institutions to Latin American countries as of 1989.”  But this narrow characterization was a late 
and ultimately unsuccessful effort to keep it the Washington Consensus term from being dragged 
into an excessively ideological realm.
13  By then it was already seen as a synonym of market 
fundamentalism and neo-liberalism.  The induction of the appealing “Washington Consensus” 
term into the ideological sphere is now a fact of history.  And this helps explain why such 
renowned economists as Nobel Prize winner Joseph Stiglitz criticize the Consensus sharply even 
as they warn about the dangers of unrestrained financial liberalization and recommend measured 
trade liberalization, along the same lines of Williamson’s initial formulation.  It is therefore more 
appropriate to characterize the Consensus—as done in this paper—as an expression of a broader 
change in economic development policy, a paradigmatic shift in favor of macroeconomic 
stabilization and market-based development.   
 
In the next sections, we keep this broad understanding of the Washington Consensus but 
focus on its economic dimensions, staying away from the heavy ideological connotations that 
                                                 
12 A fixed peg (or a predetermined path for the nominal exchange rate) was used in several LAC countries during the 
1990s to rein on inflation in an initially less contractionary manner.  On the theory of exchange rate-based inflation 
stabilization see Dornbusch (1976); Calvo (1986); Kiguel and Liviatan (1992); and Rebelo and Vegh (1995). 
13 If pushed too far, a narrow and unduly technocratic view exposes the Decalogue to countless criticisms, starting 
with the obvious one that “consensus” is too strong a term, a point made by Richard Feinberg during the 1989 IIE 
Conference itself. Feinberg argued that, given the wide spectrum of views and personalities in Washington 
institutions, a better term would have been “convergence.”  A similar criticism concerns the time horizon of the 
policies considered.  Rodrigo Botero (Williamson, 1990) argued, that “there is a certain consensus on short-term 
policy issues, less on medium-term issues (…), and still less on the long-term issues.”  Moreover, one would be hard 
pressed to argue that some of the specific policies in Williamson’s article—such as the recommendation to tax 
interest on assets held abroad—commanded strong consensus at that time.  In a broader and deeper sense, this 
narrow, technocratic characterization falls short of the mark. 10 
 
came to dominate the popular view.  We start by inquiring how the Consensus, thus understood, 
fared in Latin America in terms of actual reform implementation and consequent outcomes. 
 
4.  Consensus-Style Reforms: Implementation 
 
This section documents the intensity of reform implementation without assessing its 
effectiveness. The latter is a most relevant dimension of inquiry but lies outside of the scope of 
this paper.  The reader is referred to the numerous sources that assess implementation 
effectiveness more rigorously, often extensively, by type of reform.
14 
 
During the 1990s, most Latin American countries enthusiastically embraced Consensus-
style reforms, with the strong support from international institutions, particularly in the context 
of IMF stabilization programs and policy-based lending programs of multilateral development 
banks.  While the record is mixed and varied across countries,
15 the vigor of reform 
implementation in the region was higher than at any time in memory.  Eduardo Lora (2001) 
detects a “great wave” of Consensus-style structural reforms during the 1990s, with particular 
intensity and concentration in the first half of the 1990s (Figure 2).  His structural reform 
index—which is measured on a scale from 0 to 1 and combines policy actions in the areas of 
trade, foreign exchange, taxation, financial liberalization, privatization, labor and pensions—rose 
steeply from about 0.4 in 1989 to almost 0.6 in 1995.
16  As the structural reform process lost 
momentum around 2000, the 1990s can be considered as the “glorious years” of the Washington 
Consensus. 
 
One key reform area concerned macroeconomic stabilization, where policy action was 
impressive.  It was in the 1990s when Latin America finally conquered inflation—bringing it 
down from hyperinflation or chronically high levels to single digit rates in most countries 
(Figures 3a and 3b).  Behind this achievement were important reforms to central banking that 
virtually eliminated the monetary financing of fiscal deficits.  While progress on the fiscal front 
was less impressive than in the monetary area, things generally moved in the direction of greater 
viability, a process that, as noted, was aided in several countries by sovereign debt reduction 
agreements reached with external creditors under the Brady Initiative.  The average public sector 
deficit in the region declined from minus 2.4 percent of GDP in 1980-1989 to almost zero during 
the mid-1990s, while public sector external debt fell on average from 60 percent to 40 percent of 
GDP during the 1990s, even if the total (external and internal) public debt did not decrease much  
(Figures 4a and 4b). 
                                                 
14 For example, on capital markets reform see de la Torre and Schmukler (2007), de la Torre, Gozzi and Schmukler 
(2006 and 2007).  On pension reform see Mesa-lago (2002), Gill et al. (2004), Impavido, Lasagabaster and García-
Huitrón (2010, forthcoming).  On labor and trade reform see Heckman and Pagés-Serra (2000) and Fajnzylber and 
Maloney (2005).   
15 This heterogeneity is in part captured by Lora’s (1997) classification of Latin American countries into four 
groups: early reformers (Argentina, Chile, and Jamaica); gradual reformers (Colombia and Uruguay); recent (or late) 
reformers (Bolivia, El Salvador, Nicaragua, Paraguay, Peru, and the Dominican Republic); and slow reformers 
(Brazil, Costa Rica, Ecuador, Honduras, Mexico and Venezuela).  See also Morley et al. (1999). 
16 The advance of the reforms is measured as the margin for reform existing in 1985 that was utilized in subsequent 
years—for trade, financial, tax and privatization policies (see Lora, 1997 and 2001). 11 
 
 
Figure 2.  Latin American Structural Reform Index Average (1985-2002)  
 
   
 
Note: The advance of the reforms is measured as the margin for reform existing in 1985 that has 
been utilized in subsequent years. The index combines measures of trade, financial, tax and 
privatization policies.  
Source: Lora (2001). 
 
Considering specific components of structural reform, action was concentrated in the area 
of liberalization, both in trade and finance.  With respect to trade, the 1990s saw a confirmation 
of a liberalization trend that had started in the mid-1980s, involving mainly the removal of 
import quotas and the reduction of average import tariffs.  The average tariff rate for the region, 
which had fallen from nearly 50 percent in the early 1980s to around 33 percent in 1990, 
declined further during the 1990s to around 10 percent by 1999 (Figure 5).  The 1990s added to 
this trend a new feature—a significant reduction in the variance of import tariffs to only one 
fourth from 1990 to 1999.  
 
But it was arguably in finance where—departing from Williamson’s cautious 
formulation—Latin America’s liberalization-oriented reforms were most aggressively 
implemented.  While the region had lagged considerably behind the global wave of financial 
liberalization of the 1980s, it embraced it with vengeance during the 1990s.  The financial 
liberalization index developed by Kaminsky and Schmukler (2003) shows that it took only the 
first half of the 1990s for the region to bring relatively closed and repressed financial systems to 
a level of liberalization comparable to that of developed countries (Figure 6).  Financial 
liberalization was carried out on the domestic and external fronts.  Direct credit controls were 
abandoned and interest rates deregulated.  Restrictions on foreign investment were lifted, and 
other controls on foreign exchange and capital account transactions were dismantled.  Foreign 










Figure 3a. Latin American Inflation (1990-2000) 
 
 
Note: Weighted regional averages. 
Source: World Economic Outlook and IFS, IMF (2010). 
 
Figure 3b. LAC Inflation, Selected Countries (1990-2000) 
(In Percentage) 
 




Figure 4a. LAC Budget Balance, Selected Countries (1990-2000) 
(Percent of GDP) 
 
Note: Central government budget.  
Source: Economist Intelligence Unit (2010). 
 
Figure 4b. LAC Public Debt, Selected Countries (1990-2000) 
(Percent of GDP) 
 
Note: Central government debt.  
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Liberalization on the external front may have been attractive for many countries because 
of the region’s low domestic savings, despite its potential effects on exchange rates and financial 
systems. (Fukuyama and Birdsall, (eds.), forthcoming 2010).  Private domestic savings were low 
while public savings were constrained by high public debt service (see Figure 7, comparing Latin 
American and East Asian savings).  Perhaps this is why Williamson included taxing “flight 
capital” as a priority in the medium term.  The reliance on foreign capital inflows was in turn 
associated with constant appreciation pressures on the exchange rates, which undermined 
competitiveness in non-commodity exports.  Again the comparison with East Asia is apt.  And 
while it is well known that the reform and modernization of the regulatory and supervisory 
arrangements for financial markets lagged their liberalization—which, as noted later on, 
constituted a source of systemic vulnerability—the 1990s did see important, if insufficient, 
improvements in legal, regulatory, trading and informational infrastructures that are germane to 
financial markets.  These included the revamping or upgrading of banking and capital markets 
legislation (Figure 8).  
 
The 1990s also registered a wave of privatizations (of public banks and enterprises) and 
significant, albeit one-dimensional, pension reforms.  More than 800 public enterprises were 
privatized between 1988 and 1997 (Birdsall, de la Torre and Menezes, 2001) and the cumulative 
amount of funds raised through privatizations during the 1990s was on the order of US$200 
billion (Figure 9).
17  In pensions, Chile’s pioneering reform of 1981 had a major demonstration 
effect throughout the region.  Similar systems were adopted during the 1990s by Argentina, 
Bolivia, Colombia, Costa Rica, El Salvador, Mexico, Peru and Uruguay.
18 These reforms 
consisted basically of a shift away from government-administered, pay-as-you-go, defined-
benefit pension systems for private sector employees to systems that rely mainly on a so-called 
“second pillar” of mandatory, defined and privately-administered pension funds.  The market 
orientation herein is clear, as these pension reforms shifted from the state to the capital markets 
the dominant role in administering retirement-related savings.  
 
Lastly, structural reform intensity was more modest in tax reform and virtually non-
existent in labor markets (Figure 10).  Lora’s index of labor market reforms barely rose during 
the 1990s (progress was actually negative by 1994 and only slightly positive by 1999).   
Williamson’s inclusion of “public expenditure reprioritization” has usually not been viewed by 
students of the Consensus as a structural reform and is not even included in the reform indices—
which is itself a commentary on the tendency even in scholarly work to overlook aspects of the 




                                                 
17 The actual motives for privatization ranged from the search for efficiency gains to the need for fiscal revenues or 
pure rent-seeking.   
18 Brazil did not carry out a Chilean-style pension reform but pension funds account for a significant portion of 
Brazil’s institutional investor base.  At the end of 2004, Brazilian pension funds assets represented about 19 percent 
of GDP. 
19 There were also other important reforms implemented during the 1990s which lie outside the scope of the 
Consensus but are of importance in assessing subsequent economic performance in the region.  Several countries, 
for instance, adopted new constitutions and moved decidedly towards fiscal decentralization. 13 
 
Figure 5.  Latin American Import Tariff Liberalization (1985-1999) 




Note: The solid line represents the simple average tariff rate for Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, 
Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, Guatemala, Mexico, Peru, Uruguay and Venezuela. The area 
represents the average deviation of the tariff rate across countries. Costa Rica and Guatemala are 
excluded from the deviation calculations.  
Source: Lora (2001). 
 
 




Note: The liberalization index is calculated as the simple average of three indices (liberalization 
of the capital account, domestic financial sector and stock market) that range between 1 and 3, 
where 1 means no liberalization and 3 means full liberalization. The regional averages are simple 
country averages. 







































Figure 7.  Latin America and East Asia: Gross Domestic Savings (1970-2008) 




Note: East Asia is the un-weighted average of Hong Kong, Singapore, South Korea, Taiwan, 
Indonesia, Thailand and Malaysia, while LAC covers the whole Latin American and Caribbean 
region.  
Source: World Development Indicators (2010). 
 
 




Note:  Percentage of Latin American countries having implemented reforms.  
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Figure 9.  Latin American Cumulative Amount Raised by Privatizations (1988-2003) 
(In billion USD) 
 
 
Source: De la Torre and Schmukler (2007).
 
 




Note: The advance of the reforms is measured as the margin for reform existing in 1985 that has 
been utilized by 1989, 1995 and 1999.  
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5.  Consensus-Style Reforms: Outcomes 
 
While Latin America championed the Washington Consensus in the 1990s, the observed 
outcomes were disheartening and puzzling.  Disheartening because of what was arguably too 
meager a payoff relative to the intensity of the reform effort.  Puzzling because of the lack of 
clarity on what went wrong.  This section discusses the disheartening side of the equation.   The 
next addresses the puzzles. 
 
As noted before, inflation reduction and macroeconomic stabilization were an undeniable 
achievement of the 1990s.  In addition, the optimism inspired by the convergence of views 
around Consensus-style reforms contributed to a major surge in net private capital inflows to the 
region.  These inflows rose from US$14 billion in 1990 to $86 billion in 1997, before declining 
to US$47 billion in 1999 in the wake of the Asian financial crisis (Birdsall, de la Torre and 
Menezes, 2001).  Whether these inflows led to higher investment is a different question, and it 
seems that in general might have not (Ffrench-Davis and Reisen, 1998). 
 
But when the attention is focused on the outcome variables that really matter for 
economic development—per capita income, poverty and income distribution—it appears that the 
Washington Consensus yielded little progress during the 1990s relative to expectations in most 




5.1. Factual  Overview 
 
Consider first GDP growth and per capita income.  Regional growth did recover 
modestly—from 1.1 percent per year in 1980-1990 to 3.6 percent in 1990-1997 and 3 percent 
average for the 1990s as a whole.  But this hardly involved productivity growth and was not 
sufficient to reduce the convergence gap in per capita income between the region and the rich 
economies.
21  Instead, the ratio of per capita income in Latin America relative to the United 
States, which had already fallen precipitously during the “lost decade” of the 1980s,  continued 
to decline, albeit marginally, throughout the 1990s (see again, Figure 1).  This stands in sharp 
contrast with the experience of the East Asian Tigers, whose per capita income gap with the U.S. 
narrowed significantly, while countries pursued policies that were not framed in the Washington 
Consensus spirit of liberalization, privatization and macroeconomic stabilization.  The exception 
in the disappointing growth picture for Latin America was Chile, which became the poster child 
of the Washington Consensus policy agenda.  Real GDP growth in this country rose to an 
average of 6.4 percent per annum during the 1990s from 4.5 percent in the 1980s, so that the 
ratio of Chilean to U.S. per capita income increased significantly over the decade (Figure 1). 
 
                                                 
20 The Dominican Republic was another notable exception during the 1990s, especially in terms of robust growth 
performance. 
21 On the generally low total factor productivity growth in Latin America during the 1990s, see Loayza, Fajnzylber 
and Calderón (2005).  While overall productivity in the region was relatively low, except in the case of Chile, major 
productivity gains were realized in many countries at the sector level, especially in agriculture. 17 
 
Outcomes in the social arena were even more disappointing.  Consider first poverty.  The 
expectation was that the pickup of growth in the 1990s, modest though it was, would lead to a 
proportional reduction in poverty.
22  That expectation was not realized.  While the region’s per 
capita GDP increased by a cumulative 12 percent from 1990 to 2000, poverty rate (measured at 4 
dollars a day in PPP terms) did not decrease (Figure 11).  Moreover, the absolute number of poor 
in the region (calculated on the basis of countries’ own definitions of the poverty line) remained 
roughly constant, at around 200 million people throughout the 1990s (World Bank, 2009).   
Similar figures from ECLAC (2010) give a 1.5 percent yearly growth from 1990 to 2000 rate for 
Latin America and the Caribbean along with a slight decrease in poverty from 48.3 percent to 
43.9 percent.  Only in Chile did the poverty rate fall sharply, from 38.6 percent in 1990 to 20.2 
percent in 2000.   
 
The distributional outcomes were equally frustrating as income inequality remained 
stubbornly high throughout the 1990s (Figure 12).  The non-weighted average Gini coefficient 
for income distribution in the region increased somewhat, from 50.5 in the early 1990s to 51.4 in 
2000, while the weighted average remained virtually unchanged (World Bank, 2004).
23  Even 
Chile’s Gini coefficient was stuck at around 55 during the 1990s.  The fact is that income 
inequality is stickier than poverty everywhere and has remained stubbornly high in the region for 
decades (declining later on for the first time, and only modestly, in Brazil and Mexico during the 
2002-2007 period of faster growth).
24 
 
From a strictly technical point of view, the limited progress on social outcomes might 
have been foreseen.  The Washington Consensus reforms, as will be seen later, were mainly 
meant to liberalize and stabilize the economies and allow for growth, not reduce inequality.  But 
to the extent that the 1990s became in the public consciousness the decade of the Washington 
Consensus reforms, and those reforms became synonymous with expectations of social and 
economic growth outcomes, expectations were disappointed. 
 
5.2. Counter-Factual  Overview 
 
There is little doubt that outcomes during the 1990s in terms of growth, poverty and 
inequality were disheartening relative to expectations.  But would the assessment change if the 
focus is placed on reform impacts not relative to expectations but compared to the 
counterfactual—i.e., to what would have happened in the absence of Consensus-style policies?  
This line of inquiry—evidently of greater interest to academics than to the average citizen—has 
given rise to copious empirical research.  When all is said and done, the preponderance of the 
econometric evidence arising from this research suggests that Latin America would have been 
worse off without the reforms.  Per capita income and output in the 1990s would have been 
lower and poverty deeper.  Moreover, the relatively strong performance of Latin America during  
                                                 
22 In a well-known article, Dollar and Kraay (2001) find a robust empirical regularity that the per capita income of 
the poor increases proportionately to average per capita income. 
23 To the extent that public goods provision is not incorporated into the income-based Gini measures, inequality may 
be overstated. 
24 The situation in the unemployment front was varied but job creation was generally weak during the 1990s and 
informality tended to increase (Stallings and Peres, 2000; and World Bank, 2007). 18 
 





Source: World Bank (2009b). 
 
 
Figure 12.  International Gini Coefficients (1970-1999) 
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the global crisis of 2008-2009 can be attributed to a significant extent to improvements in 
macroeconomic and financial fundamentals resulting in part from the reforms of the 1990s and 
early 2000s (more on this later). 
 
The results from econometric studies have to be taken with a large grain of salt 
considering the numerous and thorny technical complications with the associated empirical tests.  
These include: small sample sizes; the potential presence of global trends that may affect both 
reforms and outcomes; difficulties in quantitatively isolating impacts; complications in 
establishing a causal relationships; problems with adequately measuring reforms, their degree of 
implementation and, even more, their quality; and the dependency of results on time periods 
under investigation.  In any case, while studies differ in terms of evidence and methodology and 
their results are difficult to compare, a general pattern emerges: earlier research that focuses on 
the first half of the 1990s tends to produce results that are more favorable to Consensus-style 
reforms than later research focusing on the second half of the 1990s.   
 
An important paper that sets the tone in the earlier wave of research is Lora and Barrera 
(1997).  These authors compare 1987-1989 with 1993-1995 and find that structural reforms and 
their accompanying macro stabilization spurred growth by 2.2 percentage points relative to the 
growth rate that would have been obtained in the absence of reforms, of which 1.9 points are due 
to structural reforms and the remainder to stabilization policies.  Other studies in this group went 
further to argue that actual growth performance in the region during the first part of the 1990s 
was better than that predicted by econometric models.  In this sense, growth outcomes are 
considered to have exceeded expectations—if expectations are defined as those arising from 
econometric predictions.  For example, Easterly, Loayza and Montiel (1997), using a panel from 
1960 to 1993 with 70 countries, 16 of them Latin American, find that reforms allowed the region 
to return to a 2 percent per capita growth rate from 1991 to 1993, a rate that—given country 
characteristics and the relative depth of the reforms implemented—was higher than predicted by 
their model.  Similarly, Fernández-Arias and Montiel (1997), using a panel from 1961 to 1995 
with 69 countries, 18 of which were Latin American, find that the aggregate contribution of 
stabilization and structural reforms to long-run growth was 1.84 percentage points and argue 
that, despite a negative external environment, Latin American growth during the 1990s was 
greater than otherwise predicted. 
 
While the generation of early research converges on the view that reforms boosted 
growth in the first half of the 1990s by about 2 percentage points,
25 later studies have a much less 
favorable assessment.  For example, Lora and Panizza (2002) compare 1985-1987 with 1997-
1999 and find that the reforms lifted growth in the latter period by only 0.6 percentage points.  
They conclude that the beneficial impact of reforms decreased as the 1990s unfolded and that 
their effects were largely transitory, raising the level of income but not the rate of growth.  A 
series of studies spearheaded by ECLAC also yielded very modest results and Ffrench-Davis 
(2000) calls for the reforming of the reforms. Escaith and Morley (2001) find a minimal and non-
                                                 
25 This result was confirmed later on by Loayza, Fajnzylber and Calderón (2005) who, comparing 1986-1990 with 
1996-1999, estimated that structural reforms and accompanying macro stabilization policies had a 1.9 percentage 
point average impact on growth for Latin America for the decade as a whole.  Loayza, Fajnzylber and Calderón 
(2005) is, however, an exception among the studies that appeared after 1997. 20 
 
robust effect of the reforms taken as a whole.  Stallings and Peres (2000) conclude that a 10 
percent increase in the overall reform index boosted growth by a meager 0.2 of a percentage 
point and that the effects of individual reforms were ambiguous.  While import liberalization, 
privatization and capital account opening had a positive effect, the same is not true for the tax or 
the financial reforms.  In a review article, Ocampo (2004) notes that the positive post-reform 
performance in the first part of the 1990s stands in contrast with the low growth of the “lost-half 
decade” of 1998-2002, stressing that growth during the decade was sluggish and volatile.  
 
Studies on the effects of Consensus-style reforms on poverty and inequality, independent 
of their growth effects, are rarer, with the notable exceptions of Székely and Londoño (1998) 
Morley (2000), and Behrman, Birdsall and Székely (2007).  Most studies conclude that financial 
sector liberalization was associated with an increase in income inequality, though with 
diminishing effects over time.  Other reforms, including privatization, seem to have reduced 
inequality.  The privatization of water and other services actually improved access for the poor 
and reduced the prices they paid (see studies in Nellis and Birdsall, 2005).  But the overall effect 
of the reforms was at best neutral and at worst harmful in terms of income inequality outcomes.   
 
5.3. Bottom  Line 
 
The conclusion is inescapable that, with the exception of Chile, outcomes during the 
1990s generally fell significantly short of the reformers’ expectations.  Even if inequality is not 
considered, growth and poverty reduction outcomes were disheartening when compared to the 
intensity of the reform effort.  There is reasonable support for the technical counterfactual 
argument that growth in the first part of the 1990s would have been lower and poverty higher in 
the absence of Consensus-type reforms.  But even this view loses force when: the years beyond 
1997 are taken into account, individual reforms are examined separately and growth volatility 
(not just the growth rate) is also considered.  Moreover, the counterfactual reasoning—that 
without reforms things would have been worse—provides little consolation to the region’s many 
poor and unemployed citizens.  
 
The sense of disenchantment with the Washington Consensus deepened dramatically in 
the late-1990s and early-2000s when the region was hit by a wave of financial turbulence that 
pushed several countries into crippling twin (banking and currency) crises, including Ecuador 
(1999–2000), Argentina (2001–2002), Uruguay (2002) and the Dominican Republic (2003).  Not 
surprisingly, during 2001–2003 per capita income growth in the region was negative even as 
other regions in the world enjoyed positive growth. 
 
As the region entered the new millennium not only did the Washington Consensus lose 
support but it also generated vibrant opposition in many quarters.  With societies disappointed by 
the outcomes, policy makers found little or no ground to mobilize the political coalitions needed 
for additional doses of Consensus-style reforms.
26  Not surprisingly, the region entered into a 
period of structural reform fatigue, as economic reforms stalled in most Latin American 
countries around 1997 (Lora 2001 and Lora et al. 2004).   
                                                 
26 Public opinion polls (Latinobarómetro) of the early 2000 found Latin Americans resentful of market-oriented 
reforms, especially privatization and tired of high unemployment and stagnant wages. 21 
 
 
The puzzle then is what went wrong with the Washington Consensus?  To this issue we 
turn next. 
 
6.  What Went Wrong?    
 
Setting ideological differences aside, there is a wide range of economic views on what 
went wrong with the Consensus-style reform program.  This variety of views should of course 
come as no surprise, for the same evidence examined from different perspectives can lead to 
different diagnoses.  This section provides a flavor of the range of perspectives on the subject by 
classifying them into three typological views, each of which provides a distinct and non-
reducible answer to the question of what went wrong, namely:  
 
i.  There was nothing wrong with the Consensus reform program itself.  The problem 
was the faulty implementation of the reforms (including due to political economy 
constraints) combined with impatience regarding their effects. 
 
ii.  The Consensus reform program was fundamentally flawed. This view has two very 
different variants.  Variant one: the Consensus failed to consider sequencing issues 
and threshold effects.  Variant two: the Consensus was based on a simplistic and 
ultimately wrong understanding of the linkages between policy reform and economic 
outcomes. 
 
iii.  The Consensus reform program was not wrong in what it included but it did not 
include all that was needed.  The Consensus was thus patently incomplete.  It was 
based on too narrow a view of what matters for economic development and, as a 
result, left out essential areas for reform action. 
 
Each of these contrasting views captures a relevant aspect of the debate, bringing out 
points that are mostly complementary but sometimes fundamentally at odds with each other.  
The reader should not make too much of this taxonomy of views, as there is no presumption that 
it represents a complete set nor that it is necessarily superior to potential alternative taxonomies.  
It should be seen essentially as a framework constructed from hindsight to help organize and 
discuss in an orderly fashion the salient aspects of, and discrepancies in, the assessment of the 
Washington Consensus. 
 
6.1.  Faulty Implementation and Impatience 
 
According to this view, the Washington Consensus was fundamentally right in its 
principles, content and overall design.  The set of Consensus-inspired reforms was fairly 
complete and reflects international “best practices” that are, by and large, of general applicability 
across developing countries and for a broad range of development stages.  Moreover, in line with 
the econometric evidence presented, Consensus-style reforms were part of the solution and not 
the problem. Consistent with this view, Fernández-Arias and Montiel (1997) argue that “most of 
the enormous growth gap with East Asia (…) is explained by incomplete reform” and could be 22 
 
closed by “pushing further in the direction of the reforms that have already been implemented.”  




Hence, supporters of this view argue that the shortfall in the outcomes relative to 
expectations was not due to flaws with the Consensus reform package itself but to the deficient 
manner in which it was executed.  Reforms were unevenly implemented, hence the uneven 
outcomes.  Where reforms were implemented more deeply and consistently (i.e., Chile) they 
were associated with impressive growth and poverty reduction outcomes.  In the majority of 
countries, however, reforms, even when initiated, were insufficiently implemented or suffered 
reversals.  In many cases, when laws were passed they were not adequately enforced or 
regulatory changes, institutional adaptations and capacity building did not follow.  In other cases, 
key reforms were not even initiated (as in the labor field).   
 
Moreover—this view contends—reformers were too impatient, unreasonably expecting 
results to materialize sooner than warranted.  While the expectation of a rapid payoff was 
justified with respect to some types of first-generation reforms—especially in the 
macroeconomic stabilization arena—it was unrealistic for the more complex structural reforms 
that typically require long implementation and gestation periods.  Looking back from 2010, a 
case can be made that the payoff of sustained reform did come for Latin America, when the 
global crisis of 2008-2009 hit.  Countries such as Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Mexico, and Peru that 
persevered in implementing sound macroeconomic policies over the past fifteen years and that 
reacted with appropriate reforms to the crises of the late-1990s—by introducing greater exchange 
rate flexibility, developing local-currency debt markets, reducing currency mismatches and 
modernizing financial regulation and supervision—came out of the recent global crisis bruised to 
be sure, but without systemic damage.  Those reforms helped reduce systemic vulnerability, 
prepared the countries to better face financial globalization, and enabled them to undertake 
countercyclical policies to cushion the effects of the external shock and avoid a systemic crises at 
home (Porzecanski, 2009; Rojas-Suarez, ed., 2009, and World Bank 2010a).  This illustrates that 
patience and sustained implementation of Consensus-style reforms pays off in the long run. 
 
This view does not ignore the costs of reforms, including those arising from transitory 
instability.  But it notes that this is as it should be, since teething pains and even crises are part 
and parcel of the market-oriented development process.
28  The opening and competition that 
result from liberalization may increase instability in the short run but also help expose 
weaknesses and foster a cleansing process that ultimately strengthens defenses and stimulates 
further reform.
29  Over time, through pain and success, learning takes place and incentives are 
eventually set right, yielding durable results.  Chile’s strengths owe in no small part to a 
constructive reaction to the painful crises of the late 1970s and early 1980s. The message that 
                                                 
27 Additional renditions of this sort of message can be found in Krueger (2004) and World Bank (1997). 
28 Aghion, Bacchetta, and Banerjee (2004) show theoretically that countries undergoing intermediate stages of 
financial development are likely to experience greater instability that countries in either advanced or early stages of 
financial development.   
29 Consistent with this hypothesis, Kaminsky and Schmukler (2003) find that financial liberalization is associated 
with more pronounced boom-bust cycles in the short run but leads to more stable financial markets in the long run. 23 
 
naturally arises from this view is the need to persevere.  Reforms must be sustained and 
consistent.  And along the path to economic development a premium should be placed on letting 
market discipline work, recognizing that it sets in motion a process of “creative destruction” that 
involves short-term pain and long-term gain.   
 
The emphasis going forward, this view would stress, should be on overcoming political 
resistance to reform implementation, as it is now well known that politics mattered much more 
than reformers anticipated.  Much of the political economy constraints revolve around the 
collective action problem.  That is, the difficulty of mobilizing broad support for reform given 
the status quo bias that emerges from self-reinforcing factors, including the fact that losses from 
reform have to be absorbed upfront while the (greater) gains accrue overtime, and the fact that 
losers are easy to identify and typically well-informed and well-organized (which boosts their 
capacity to lobby against reform) while winners (including future generations) are dispersed, 
unorganized and prefer to free ride.
30  Taking into account the political economy of reform 
implementation is essential to complement the technical soundness of reforms.       
 
6.2. Fundamental  Flaws 
 
  This view, in sharp contrast with the previous one, finds the Washington Consensus 
agenda to be seriously flawed in some fundamental sense.  It involves two variants that are very 
different in nature.   
 
The first variant is the sequencing critique.  The original formulation of the Consensus 
was mostly silent on sequencing.  It left open the question whether the outcomes would be 
similar, independently of whether reforms were implemented simultaneously or separately and, 
in the latter case, regardless of the order of implementation.  A key focus of this critique, though 
by no means not the only one, is on premature financial market liberalization—the de-regulation 
of the domestic financial system and opening of the external capital account ahead of adequate 
regulatory strengthening.  A wrong sequencing of reforms in this field can turn the normal pains 
of growing up into unnecessary suffering, as financial crises can rapidly wipe out gains achieved 
over several decades (Bhagwati, 1998 and Stiglitz, 2002). 
 
Earlier versions of the sequencing critique to financial liberalization applied mainly to the 
domestic banking system.  Weak banking systems are ill-prepared to operate prudently in freer 
financial markets and properly intermediate surges in capital inflows.  As a result, they become 
prone to credit bubbles followed by credit busts (Gavin and Hausmann, 1996).  Therefore, a 
minimum threshold of institutional strength—in terms of the legal framework, regulatory system, 
supervisory capacity, and accounting and disclosure standards—should be in place before 
                                                 
30 Fernandez and Rodrik (1991) argue that there can also be a status quo bias in the presence of uncertainty with 
regards to the distribution of gains and losses.  Alesina and Drazen (1991), focusing on fiscal adjustment, conclude 
that any efficient policy change with significant distributional consequences can be delayed by a “war of attrition.” 
Lora (2000) finds that crises are significant predictors of reform while Lora and Olivera (2005) show that reformers 
can pay a significant price in the ballots.  24 
 
liberalizing the financial system.
31   
 
In the second half of the 1990s, the critique was first applied to the domestic banking 
system.
32  Weak banking systems are ill-prepared to operate prudently in freer financial markets 
and properly intermediate surges in capital inflows, becoming prone to credit bubbles followed 
by credit busts (Gavin and Hausmann, 1996).  A minimum threshold of institutional strength 
should be in place before liberalizing the financial system.  This sort of sequence is of course 
easier to implement in countries where financial systems are repressed by administrative controls 
and the capital account is relatively closed.  But what to do with respect to countries whose 
financial system is already liberalized?  Some would counsel emerging economies to roll back 
capital market opening and “throw sand in the wheels,” including through the use of Chilean-
style disincentives on short-term “hot money” inflows.  Some would even suggest that 
liberalization of capital flows should be managed on a permanent basis (Fukuyama and Birdsall 
(eds.), forthcoming 2010), as full financial integration might never be desirable (Ocampo, 2003; 
Stiglitz, 1999 and 2000; and Tobin, 2000).  Others would advocate delaying further liberalization 
while attention is reoriented towards re-prioritizing reforms, in favor of strengthening in earnest 
the regulatory and institutional preconditions. 
 
A later version of the financial sequencing critique—stemming from the so-called 
‘original sin’ literature—focuses on currency and maturity mismatches in the balance sheets of 
borrowers.  The “original sin” consists of the inability of emerging economy sovereigns and 
corporates to issue long-term domestic currency denominated debt, which begets the currency 
mismatches that, in turn, raise systemic vulnerability.  In a first incarnation, this literature 
recommended the adoption of formal dollarization to bypass the “original sin” (Calvo and 
Reinhart, 2000; Hausmann et al., 1999).  In light of the disastrous collapse of the Argentine 
currency board,
33 a second incarnation of this literature focused, instead, on sequencing—the 
need to develop the market for domestic currency denominated debt before completely opening 
the capital account (Eichengreen, Hausmann and Panizza, 2005).  Proponents point to Australia 
as an example of a country that got this sequence right, one that is arguably also being adopted 
by the two largest emerging economies—India and China (Lane and Schmukler, 2006). 
   
In general, sequencing arguments can also involve a reference to threshold effects—i.e., 
the notion that positive outcomes cannot be attained unless a minimum degree of implementation 
                                                 
31 A number of theoretical papers show that financial liberalization may be associated with crises (see, for example, 
Allen and Gale, 2000; Bachetta and van Wincoop, 2000; Calvo and Mendoza, 2000; and McKinnon and Pill, 1997).  
Empirically, several papers have found links between financial deregulation, boom-bust cycles, and banking and 
balance of payments crises (see, for example, Corsetti, Pesenti, and Roubini, 1999; Demirguc-Kunt and Detragiache, 
1999; Kaminsky and Reinhart, 1999; and Tornell and Westermann, 2005). 
32 A brilliant, pre-Consensus rendition of the sequencing critique can be found in Díaz-Alejandro (1984). 
33 On the rise and fall of the Argentine convertibility system see Cavallo and Cottani (1997), De la Torre, Levy 
Yeyati and Schmukler (2003), Perry and Serven (2003), and Galiani, Heymann and Tommasi (2003).  For 
assessments of the conceptual and empirical basis in support of exchange rate flexibility see, for instance, Goldstein 
(2002), Larraín and Velasco (2001), and Mishkin and Savastano (2002).  Prior to the early 2000s, hard-pegs or 
dollarization, on the one hand, and exchange rate flexibility, on the other, were seen as competing, albeit equally 
respectable, alternatives for emerging economies seeking a safe integration into international capital markets (Calvo 
and Reinhart, 2002; Eichengreen and Hausmann, 1999; Fischer, 2001; and Frankel, 1999). 25 
 
of an appropriate combination of complementary reforms is achieved.  This perspective leads to 
the recommendation that reforms should be ordered so as to ensure that certain preconditions are 
put in place first to enhance the likelihood of success of subsequent reforms.  Thus, the best 
designed fiscal rules would not work well in the absence of institutional preconditions that 
prevent, say, populist governments from arbitrarily breaking rules and contracts.  This 
perspective also leads to the warning that there may be little or no gain (and maybe even 
significant losses) if a critical mass of complementary reforms is not implemented in a 
coordinated fashion (Rojas-Suarez, ed., 2009).    
 
There are many more aspects to the debate on sequencing and threshold effects.
34  Trade 
liberalization in the absence of a safety net can undermine poverty reduction, and privatization 
short of an adequate regulatory framework may lead to monopoly pricing.  In some cases, the 
resulting political backlash can also short-circuit the reform process itself.  Initial uncorrected 
flaws may compromise implementation.  In all, the “right” sequence is easier to define on paper 
than in the real world where reformers usually had to make do with second-best approaches in 
the face of political constraints.  As such, sequencing remains largely an academic consideration. 
 
Consider now the second variant of the view that the Washington Consensus incurred 
fundamental flaws.  It contends that the main error was the Consensus’ apparent assumption that 
a one-to-one mapping exists always and everywhere between reforms and economic outcomes.  
The reality is, however, much more complex and elusive.  Even perfect sequencing could lead to 
faulty outcomes depending on their mapping to reforms.  As noted by Hausmann, Rodrik and 
Velasco (2008), reforms that “work wonders in some places may have weak, unintended, or 
negative effects in others.”  The empirical evidence that specific reform packages have 
predictable, robust, and systematic effects on national growth rates is weak (Rodrik, 2005a).
35  
Much of the variance that explains the difference in countries’ growth rates is random, which 
implies that imitating successful reform experiences of other countries may not be wise (Easterly 
et al., 1993).  In sum, contrary to the implicit understanding of the Washington Consensus as 
generally applicable, effective reform agendas have to be carefully tailored to individual country 
circumstances, both in their design and implementation sequence.  The expectation that reforms 
would promise certain good outcomes almost automatically was simply wrong.  
 
It does not necessarily follow from this variant that anything goes when it comes to 
growth determinants and the design of reform packages.  A constructive and nuanced way 
forward is feasible under this view, as illustrated in Dani Rodrik’s (2005b) “Growth Strategies” 
chapter in the Handbook of Economic Growth.  While specific reform packages must be tailor-
made, good economics highlights the crucial relevance of growth “foundations” or “first 
principles,” notably the role of technological innovation and institutions such as property rights, 
                                                 
34 Graham and Naím (1998), for instance, see macroeconomic stability as a precondition for more extensive and 
gradual institutional reform.  Rodrik (1990) argues for undertaking a few, deep reforms with narrow scope.   
Martinelli and Tommasi (1997), by contrast, note that radical or so-called bitter pill reform strategies can be optimal 
due to credibility problems and political sustainability considerations. 
35 The lack of robustness is highlighted by, for example, Levine and Renelt (1992), Rodriguez and Rodrik (2000), 
and Ciccone and Jarocinski (2007), who show that the empirical results of regressions on growth determinants are 
sensitive to changes in country samples, control variables and econometric specifications.   26 
 
sound money, fiscal viability and contestable markets (Growth Commission 2008 and Rojas-
Suarez, ed., 2009).  Although the mapping of first principles to specific reform packages is 
elusive and country-specific, it can be adequately served by diverse policy packages.   
 
Moreover, growth strategies must be informed by the critical distinction between igniting 
and sustaining growth (Hausmann, Pritchett and Rodrik, 2005).  Igniting growth in a particular 
country typically requires a few (often unconventional) reforms that need not unduly tax the 
country’s limited institutional capacity.  But the exact composition of these few reforms and how 
they can successfully be combined with “first principles” cannot be predicted easily—it varies 
from country to country.  Sustaining growth is a different matter—it requires the cumulative 
building of functional institutions to maintain productive dynamism and endow the economy 
with resilience to shocks over the long term.  A sensible growth strategy would search for the 
tailor-made agenda of few reforms that can ignite a growth process.  Once ignited, growth itself 
can help align incentives in the political economy in favor of reforms that strengthen the growth 
foundations, thus setting in motion a virtuous circle that sustains growth over the long haul. 
 
Putting together growth-oriented reform programs that are adequately adapted to a given 
country is then a much more difficult and complex task than the Washington Consensus led 
people to believe.  But it is not an impossible task.  To avoid getting things wrong, there is no 
substitute for deep country knowledge and experience.  To use an analogy often mentioned by 
the late Rudy Dornbusch, good reformers are like good “country doctors” than can develop good 
diagnoses and suitable cures for individual patients whom they know well.  Adequately designed 
and appropriately implemented reforms are more likely to be developed by well-trained, 
practically-minded, and experienced economists that collectively have not only a good grasp of 
international reform practices but also experience in and strong knowledge of the circumstances 
of the country in question.  These packages will, by definition, stay away from the mechanical 
application of ‘best practices’ and from un-prioritized laundry list-type reform agendas.  They 
will also stay away from the pessimistic belief that nothing can be done where institutions are 
weak.  Much help can be obtained in this process from a finer “growth diagnostics” method, one 
that focuses on the binding constraints to growth, rather than on the distance to “best practices,” 
along the lines of the method proposed by Hausmann, Rodrik and Velasco (2008).
 36  While not a 
silver bullet, this method can greatly complement the task of reform prioritization and design. 
 
6.3. Incomplete  Agenda 
 
  This third view agrees with the first one in stating that the Consensus reform program 
was not wrong in what it included.  But it differs from it in claiming that the Consensus was 
patently incomplete, that it did not include all the relevant reforms needed to achieve sustainable 
                                                 
36 The authors couch their argument in a second-best framework.  They focus not only on the direct (negative) effect 
of the specific distortion, but on the additional interactions of this distortion with the other inefficiencies in the 
economy.  Given the impossibility of reaching the first best, the authors suggest focusing on the country’s most 
binding constraints, as this increases the chances that the benefits of relaxing a binging constraint will not offset by 
indirect adverse effects.  For a discussion of the growth diagnostics method along with applications to a number of 
Latin American countries see IDB (2009).  On the limitations of the method see De la Torre (2007). 27 
 
and equitable growth.  The Consensus simply had too narrow an understanding of what matters 
for economic growth and development. 
 
  Trying to assemble a comprehensive list of important reform areas left out by the 
Consensus is a rather futile exercise—for the components chosen for inclusion are not 
independent of the perspective adopted and the preferences of the researcher—and one that in 
any case lies beyond the scope of this paper.  In what follows, therefore, we illustrate this view 
using as guidance key flagship reports published by multilateral development agencies (World 
Bank, IDB, ECLAC and CAF) since the second half of the 1990s.  Using headline publications 
from some of the institutions that supported (and at times actively championed) the Consensus 
during the 1990s helps to highlight the growing acceptance of this third view.  
 
  Among the many reform areas left out by the Washington Consensus are: (a) volatility; 
(b) institutions; (c) knowledge and technological innovation; and (d) equity.
37  What these areas 
have in common is the presence of significant market failures (due to externalities, coordination 
problems and imperfect information) which markets themselves cannot repair and that thus 
require active policy.  They were not seen as part of Consensus-style reform agenda basically 
because the Consensus relied on well-functioning markets to solve the relevant development 
challenges and viewed any state interference in the economy with suspicion. Successful 
reformers, like Chile, also implemented important reforms in these other areas, thus 
supplementing the Washington Consensus. 
 
Consider first volatility.  By focusing on the first moment—the average or expected value 
of reform effects—Washington Consensus-style policies ignored the crucial relevance of the 
second moment—the variance of such effects.  The fact is that volatility has an independent, 
first-order impact on economic development.  This argument was forcibly put forward in the 
1995 annual report of the IDB Overcoming Volatility.  It discussed Latin America’s proneness to 
volatility, driven by a high incidence of external shocks whose effects are magnified by shallow 
financial markets and inconsistent macro policies.  Volatility is estimated to have reduced the 
region’s historical growth rate by one percentage point, with particularly strong negative impacts 
on investment in infrastructure and human capital, and especially detrimental impacts on poverty 
and inequality.  To overcome volatility, reforms need to put a premium on export diversification, 
financial market deepening and stable macroeconomic, particularly fiscal, policy.
38   
                                                 
37 A key area that was completely ignored by the Washington Consensus and yet is not in this list is environmental 
sustainability, particularly climate change.  This topic is not developed here because it is as much about global as 
well as domestic policy.  The topic was until recently relegated to sector experts but Nicholas Stern (2008) decidedly 
brought climate change to the core of development policy thinking, arguing that greenhouse gas emissions represent 
the biggest market failure the world has seen.  That climate change has been finally mainstreamed into Latin 
American development policy thinking is illustrated by the 2009 flagship report of the Latin American Region of the 
World Bank entitled Low Carbon, High Growth: Latin American Reponses to Climate Change.  For a global 
perspective, see the 2010 World Development Report Development and Climate Change. 
38 Follow-up articles to this report, which expand on the analysis and conclusions, include Gavin and Hausman 
(1996) and Gavin et al. (1996).  They highlight the interplay of volatility with the region’s precarious access to 
international financial markets and fiscal pro-cyclicality and propose as additional solutions regional integration and 
collective risk hedging.  In a similar vein, Caballero (2001) proposes a simple organizing framework to study 
shocks, volatility, and crises in the context of weak international financial integration and underdeveloped domestic 28 
 
 
Subsequent reports of the World Bank and ECLAC drove home similar arguments and 
worries.  The 2000 flagship publication of the Latin America region of the World Bank, Securing 
our Future in the Global Economy,  raised policy issues from the macroeconomic, social, 
financial, labor and poverty dimensions.  At ECLAC, Ffrench-Davis and Ocampo (2001) argued 
that financial liberalization brought with it the globalization of volatility and a new variety of 
crises linked to shocks to the newly deregulated emerging capital markets.  Indiscriminate 
opening of the capital account led to macroeconomic and financial disequilibria, placing 
countries in a “financierist trap” of high vulnerability.  To escape the trap, a relatively flexible 
exchange rate and comprehensive macroeconomic regulation is recommended.  
 
Consider next institutions.  The Consensus overlooked the institutional underpinnings of 
its proposed policies, with one key exception: establishing secure property rights which, in the 
spirit of De Soto (1989), should also be available to the informal sector.  However, quoting 
Rodrik (2006), property rights “was the last item on the list and came almost as an afterthought.”  
Williamson himself shared the view (see Birdsall and de la Torre, 2001) that property rights were 
added “mostly to get to a total of 10 items.”  In general, the Consensus was largely blind to 
institutions.  It came at the end of the 1980s before what amounted to an institutional revolution 
in the development economics literature in the 1990s.  
 
While institutions became firmly established among academic economists since the 
1980s,
39 multilateral agencies jumped onto the institutional bandwagon starting in the late 1990s, 
as the realization grew stronger that the efficiency of markets and durability of reform effects 
needs appropriate institutional frameworks to avoid such problems as rent-seeking and policy 
reversals.  In Latin America, this was illustrated in the IDB’s 1997 report Latin America after a 
Decade of Reforms as well as the 1998 World Bank’s regional flagship entitled Beyond the 
Washington Consensus: Institutions Matter.  The former summarizes the evidence on the role of 
institutions in long run economic development, makes a case in favor of the feasibility of 
institutional reform, and offers a policy-oriented analysis of institutional reform issues in the 
financial sector, education, judicial systems and public administration.  The latter develops an 
analytical framework and uses case studies to explain why policy reform processes that work in 
                                                                                                                                                             
financial markets.  He advocates longer-term solutions via financial market deepening and prudential regulation; for 
the short-run, however, he argues for the use of international insurance as well as contingent monetary, fiscal and 
labor market policies. 
39 The seminal work was that of Nobel laureate Douglas North (1990), who defines institutions as a “set of rules, 
compliance procedures and moral and ethical behavioral norms designed to constrain the behavior of individuals.”  
A pioneering application of the institutional approach to development was Engerman and Sokoloff (1997), who 
trace differences in economic development throughout the Americas to the nature of colonial institutions interacting 
with initial resource endowments. Hall and Jones (1999) present evidence to support the thesis that “the primary, 
fundamental determinant of a country’s long-run economic performance is its social infrastructure.”  It was perhaps 
the contributions of Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson (2001 and 2002) that gave institutions a definitive push in the 
development profession.  To address the endogeneity of institutions and income, they used the now famous colonial 
settler mortality instrument and conclude not only that institutions are key drivers of growth, but also that they are 
responsible for the reversal of fortunes of once rich nations.  In a similar vein, the empirical study by Rodrik et al. 
(2004) finds that institutional variables, rather than integration or geographical variables, matter the most for 
economic development. 29 
 
certain institutional environments may not work in others. The institutional literature also 
influenced the 2008 Growth Commission Report chaired by Michael Spence, which concludes 
that there can be no simple recipe for growth and sustainable development, implying that too 
much is country-specific to define any general policy consensus. 
   
Consider now knowledge and technological innovation.  If the Washington Consensus 
touched on this area, it did so indirectly—when it advocated the reorientation of public 
expenditure towards education and emphasized the need to remove barriers to FDI.  The latter 
was intended not just to enhance competition but also to facilitate technological transfer.  That 
the Consensus did not delve more deeply into policies related to technological innovation is 
somewhat surprising.  After all, technological progress is at the heart of market-based growth 
and has been regarded as the main driver of productivity growth in economic theory since the 
times of Robert Solow’s publications in the 1950s.  The implicit assumption in Consensus-style 
reform agendas seems to have been that policies to promote export orientation and the opening to 
FDI would be sufficient to achieve the adoption and adaptation of new technologies as well as to 
eventually foster the capacity to innovate. 
 
While the theme of knowledge and innovation was never absent from the academic 
literature, multilateral agencies sought to bring it squarely into Latin American development 
policy thinking during the early 2000s.  An important precursor was ECLAC’s 1990 report on 
Productive Transformation with Equity.  Later on, the Latin American region of the World Bank 
devoted its 2002 flagship publication to the need to shift From Natural Resources to the 
Knowledge Economy.  This publication was subsequently complemented by the 2003 regional 
flagship on Closing the Gap in Education and Technology and the work of Lederman and 
Maloney (2007).  This body of research argues that the region’s growth has not lagged behind 
due to a natural-resource curse but due to a major shortfall in technological adoption and 
innovation.  The regional deficiency in “national learning capacity” is not independent of its gap 
in the quality of its education (Figure 13 shows LAC’s backwardness in this regard), which along 
with entrepreneurship constitutes a key ingredient for innovation.  A premium should then be 
placed on policies to diversify international trade and foreign direct investment flows, improve 
education (particularly secondary and tertiary), deepen the links between universities and the 
private sector, and foster the development of innovation networks.   
 
Around that time, the IDB and the Andean Development Corporation (CAF) focused on 
the role of knowledge and technology in growth from the perspective of competitiveness. They 
did so through their annual reports entitled, respectively, Competitiveness: the Business of 
Growth (IDB, 2001) and Competiveness and Growth (Sachs and Vial, 2002).  ECLAC also 
launched a 2008 Report on Structural Change and Productivity Growth.  To correct the low 
levels of factor accumulation and productivity in Latin America, policies should aim at 
alleviating credit constraints, modernizing labor markets, boosting human capital investment, 
easing infrastructure bottlenecks, and fostering the development of clusters and supply chains.   
 
Consider finally equity.  As noted, it was in the social arena where the disenchantment 
with the Washington Consensus was greatest.  Williamson himself later declared (see Birdsall 
and De la Torre, 2001) that the Consensus policies he compiled were oriented towards achieving 30 
 
efficiency, not equity, and that he “deliberately excluded from the list anything which was 
primarily redistributive [because he] felt that the Washington of the 1980s (…) was essentially 
contemptuous of equity concerns”   
 




Note: Public expenditure per student is the public current spending on education divided by the 
total number of students in the primary level. 




When it comes to economic development, equity considerations are not simply a helpful 
corollary, but an essential ingredient, especially in unequal Latin America.  For one thing, equity 
is in itself as important a developmental objective as growth—not least considering that 
excessive inequality of outcomes and high inequality of opportunity constitute an insult to our 
basic sense of justice.  To the extent that reforms’ uneven outcomes reflect unequal 
opportunities—across racial or ethnic groups and between those born poor as those born rich—
their sense of unfairness also undermines the legitimacy of those reforms.  Moreover, by failing 
to more explicitly deal with equity, the Washington Consensus neglected what is in effect a key 
impediment to growth.  High income inequality not only hinders the impact of growth on poverty 
reduction but can itself contribute to low growth which, in turn, makes it difficult to reduce 
inequality.  Institutions and policies in contexts with high poverty rates and heavy concentrations 
of income may themselves be a source of growth-impairing inefficiency (Aghion et al., 1999; 
World Bank, 2006; Levy and Walton, 2009; Demirguc-Kunt and Levine, 2009).  Under those 
conditions, the interplay among political parties, business organizations and powerful large labor 
unions can result in rent-seeking and monopoly behavior that undermines the growth gains the 




















































































endowments of financial and human capital—typical of Latin America—are widely 
acknowledged as a constraint on growth, implying that inequality itself is worth addressing 
explicitly to minimize that perverse combination. 
 
It was precisely in the failure to include an explicit concern with equity that Birdsall, De 
la Torre and Menezes (2008) find the most notable shortcoming of Washington Consensus-
inspired reform packages.  The omission undermined the benefits of and enthusiasm for market 
oriented reforms.  In a booklet first published in 2001 under the title Washington Contentious 
and subsequently expanded into a 2008 book entitled Fair Growth, these authors discuss win-
win policies that would serve the interests of greater equity while enhancing growth directly and 
indirectly.  They reaffirm the relevance of fiscal discipline and counter-cyclical macroeconomic 
and financial policies.  But they also emphasize new areas for policy action, including the 
establishment of automatic social safety nets; improving schooling for the poor; making income 
taxes progressive in practice; building a more supportive environment for small businesses; 
protecting worker rights and labor mobility; launching a head-on attack on corruption and 
discrimination; repairing land markets and establishing consumer-driven public services.  
 
The equity theme was also bought to the center stage of the development policy debate 
through official publications by multilateral agencies.  In its 1998 annual report Facing Up to 
Inequality in Latin America the IDB studied the resilience of the region’s high inequality, 
attributing the gap mainly to wage differentials in a segmented labor market and underlying 
educational disparity.  ECLAC focused on this issue in its 2001 Equity, Development and 
Citizenship, where redistributive fiscal policies were highlighted.  Inequality was also tackled in 
the World Bank’s 2004 regional flagship Inequality in Latin America and the Caribbean: 
Breaking with History?  The report emphasizes the deep historical roots of inequality and its 
multidimensionality, affecting not just income but also the distribution of education, health, 
water, sanitation, electricity and telecommunication provision.  It recommends using the 
redistributive power of the state through progressive taxation, basic service provision and 
transfers.  It also advocates policies aimed at broadening asset ownership by democratizing 
education, improving land distribution, investing in public infrastructure and making labor 
markets truly inclusive.   
 
7. Concluding  Remarks   
 
For all of its faults, the policies set out in Williamson’s original Washington Consensus 
hold enduring messages.  Countries that ignore them do so at their peril.  If there is any 
consensus about the Consensus, it is especially with respect to sound macroeconomic policy, 
including not only fiscal discipline (still a challenge in most of the region) and transparent and 
steady monetary policy, but arguably also the logic of flexible exchange rates with a small dose 
of management. On these the Consensus aptly reflected the direction taken by most Latin 
policymakers since the late 1980s, by then already deeply allergic to the region’s periodic and 
destructive bouts of inflation.  This allergy was shared by citizens and voters virtually 
everywhere making it politically possible for small technically adept cadre to implement the 
appropriate stabilization policies in line with the Consensus (Naím, 2000).  On these 
macroeconomic policies the controversy has focused not on the merits of the policies themselves, 32 
 
but on the role of the IMF and the World Bank in conditioning their lending not only on 
reasonable fixes to macro problems but also on privatization, trade and capital market 
liberalization and other structural policies, leaving aside the supportive institutional matrix to an 
extent that in many countries turned out to be politically toxic.  
 
While the Consensus is typically criticized for its dogmatic adherence to market 
fundamentalism, the view that development must be market based has in fact endured—not only 
in Latin America, the original home of the Consensus, but throughout the developing world  
(Birdsall, forthcoming 2010).  The reliance on markets to foster development is in effect a New 
Consensus among emerging markets and other developing countries, and it has survived well the 
crises of the second half of the 1990s and early-2000s as well as the global crisis of 2008-2009, 
including in Africa (Radelet, forthcoming 2010).  To be sure, warring parties have engaged over 
the past quarter century in heated debates about the merits and shortcomings of the Consensus 
(defined variously as the original ten points, market fundamentalism, neo-liberalism or multiple 
variations of those).  Yet beyond the differences, the great majority of developing countries—
across the ideological spectrum from China to Chile—in fact adhere to a market orientation and 
indeed to a quest for safe integration into global markets.   
 
So, on the one hand, the love-and-hate affair with the 1989 Washington Consensus might 
be over.  On the other, for developing countries including across Latin America, the marriage of 
the state to markets is firmly in place. But a complex challenge that will test any new consensus 
going forward will be on how to manage and adapt that marriage in a shock-prone global 
economy.  Global shocks widen the gap between private and social interests and increase the 
premium on global public goods and global collective action—as was brutally highlighted by the 
subprime crisis turned global.  For Latin America, the limits and benefits of the role of the state 
in a global economy will once again be on the agenda, and arguably with a greater sense of 
urgency 
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